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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AUDREY FORSMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GEORGE FORSMAN, RONALD G. FLINDERS 
and DOES I through X, Case No. 860430 
Defendants and Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Respondent Forsman addresses the following issues which are 
presented by Mrs. Forsman*s appeal of the summary judgment in 
favor of Mr. Forsman: 
1. Whether the district court properly dismissed 
Mrs. Forsman's negligence action against her husband based on 
the doctrine of interspousal immunity. 
2. Whether the district court properly applied Utah 
choice of law rules in applying the law of the state where the 
cause of action arose. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Forsman accepts his wife's statement of the case to the 
extent that statement addresses the issues raised between them. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court properly granted summary judgment for 
Mr. Forsman based on interspousal immunity. Interspousal 
immunity for ordinary negligence is an established part of the 
law of Utah. Upon reexamination, the bar against one spouse 
suing the other continues to serve a vital and beneficent 
purpose and should therefore remain the law of Utah, unless and 
until the Utah legislature chooses to change that policy. 
The District Court also properly applied Utah law as 
opposed to California law in determining whether Mrs. Forsman 
has a cause of action against Mr. Forsman. Utah law provides 
that the law of the place of the wrong governs even if the 
parties to the action are from other jurisdictions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CHANGE THE LAW TO 
ALLOW MRS. FORSMAN TO SUE MR. FORSMAN FOR 
NEGLIGENCE. 
Since Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 
(1963), Utah has not permitted one spouse to sue the other for 
ordinary negligence. Rubalcava was decided after many juris-
dictions across the country had already chosen to eliminate 
interspousal immunity. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 26 Cal. 
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Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962). Unlike some Utah Supreme Court 
opinions from twenty years ago, Rubalcava is not a perfunctory 
treatment of the issues. Rather, the Court thoroughly 
addressed the arguments against interspousal immunity and 
thoroughly stated its reasons for concluding that the law 
should not allow a wife to sue a husband for ordinary negli-
gence. Mr. Forsman respectfully submits to this Court that our 
social and legal structure is not so different today than it 
was in 1963. The same logic that supported the decision in 
Rubalcava supports affirmance of the District Court's decision 
in this case. 
There continue to be strong public policy reasons for 
prohibiting one spouse from suing the other for ordinary 
negligence. Those policy reasons are as follows: 
1. Promotion of marital harmony; 
2. Prevention of collusive lawsuit; 
3. Avoidance of rewarding defendant spouse for his 
or her own wrongdoing; 
4. Avoidance of the possibility of trivial or 
spurious lawsuits between spouses; and 
5. A change in public policy of the State should 
come from the Legislature. 
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1. Promotion of Marital Harmony 
If a husband could sue his wife for an unintended wrong, 
such suits might well create or aggravate marital discord. In 
Rubalcava, this Court recognized that "it should be the purpose 
of the law to protect family solidarity." Id. at 384 P.2d 
391. Barring negligence suits between spouses promotes harmony 
and tranquility in the home and allows spouses to resolve these 
problems in a manner that may enhance the marital relation-
ship. It should be noted that since Rubalcava, the harshness 
of this rule to the injured spouse has been softened consider-
ably by the enactment of the no-fault insurance law. That law 
provides for payment of medical expenses and wage loss to an 
injured spouse without the need for fault finding. It is only 
the further recovery which requires accusation and litigation 
that should be forestalled. 
As the Florida Supreme Court has stated: 
When one ponders the effect upon the marriage rela-
tionship were each spouse free to sue the other for 
every real or fancied wrong . . . one can imagine what 
the havoc would be to the tranquility of the home. 
Certainly the success of the . . . institution of 
marriage must depend in large degree upon harmony 
between the spouses, and the relationship could easily 
be disrupted and the lives of offspring blighted if 
bickerings blossomed into lawsuits and conjugal dis-
putes into vexatious, if not expensive, litigation. 
Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950). As further 
explained in Thomas v. Harron, 20 Ohio 2d 62, 253 N.E.2d 772, 
775 (1969): 
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Litigation under these circumstances pits one spouse 
against the other. Its necessary ingredients can 
easily provide a source of serious irritation to the 
marital relationship. Furthermore, if an incident 
which occurred before marriage is imposed upon that 
relationship by litigation, it is then possible, if 
not probable, that that which should have been for-
given and forgotten will instead be destructive to 
marital harmony. 
The home, not the court, is the place for husband and wife 
to resolve their differences. 
This Court has recognized and discarded as unpersuasive 
arguments to the contrary. The first such argument is that 
"the wrongful act has likely impaired the marital harmony 
anyway, so the lawsuit would not extend the rift, but, if 
anything, would tend to rectify it.M Rubalcava, 384 P.2d at 
389. This Court was not persuaded. Clearly, such an argument 
has merit in the context of the commission of an intentional 
tort. That argument, however, has no merit in and should not 
be extended to the commission of an unintentional tort. There 
is no reason to assume that an act of negligence reflects a 
lack of marital harmony. 
A second contrary argument is "that since the insurance 
company, and not the defendant, will have to pay, the family 
exchequer will not suffer so much by allowing the action as by 
denying it, so the family harmony will not be harmed but may be 
saved by allowing the action." Id. at 390-91. Once again, 
this Court in Rubalcava rejected as unpersuasive the argument 
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that domestic harmony will not be impaired or that public 
policy will be advanced by a lawsuit between spouses when the 
defendant spouse is protected by liability insurance. The 
Rubalcava Court stated: "The answer to the argument for 
marital harmony, that this court will not be engendered when 
the insurance company is to pay, is neither sound nor entirely 
realistic." Id., at 391. 
Admittedly, where insurance coverage exists, the bringing 
of a lawsuit may not always create or substantially enhance 
marital discord, but there exists the likelihood of inter-
spousal collusion, discussed infra. To the extent that marital 
disharmony would be reduced by the availability of insurance, 
the potential for fraud is increased. Where no threat of fraud 
exists because there is no insurance, the risk of marital 
discord is increased. The Florida Court recently stated: 
Adversary tort lawsuits between spouses have an 
upsetting and embittering effect upon domestic 
tranquility and the marital relationship. But 
non-adversary lawsuits that do not disturb the peace 
and harmony of the marriage encourage fraudulent and 
collusive claims, particularly where a third-party 
insurance company must pay any judgment awarded. 
Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 475 So.2d 
1211, 1212 (Fla. 1985) (quoting Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 
352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980)). 
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A third argument against the idea that such lawsuits would 
inhibit marital harmony is that when one spouse brings a suit 
against the other, there is little marital tranquility to 
preserve. That argument is unpersuasive. Conjugal tranquility 
may have been disturbed by the instigation of the lawsuit. 
Clearly, the allegations, discovery, evidence, testimony and 
posturing required to maintain or defend successfully a negli-
gence action would create or aggravate tension and ruin an 
otherwise salvageable marriage. Where insurance exists, as 
discussed above, and the strong policy of marital tranquility 
is realized, it is unreasonable to assume that the defendant 
spouse, who continued living with the plaintiff spouse, would 
defend and assist in the defense wholeheartedly. 
Finally, Mrs. Forsman's reliance on this Court's decision 
to strike down the guest statute is not well founded. In 
Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio 2d 269, 383 N.E.2d 888 (Ohio 
1978), the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected a similar attempt to 
analogize interspousal immunity to the guest statute. The 
Court concluded: 
We think it sufficient to state that the interspousal 
immunity doctrine, with its inherent differential 
treatment of spouses and non-spouses, reasonably 
relates to the legitimate state interest of fostering 
marital harmony and preventing fraud and collusion. 
The difference between this doctrine and [the guest 
statute] lies in the higher state concern for regu-
lating marriage and the greater potential for fraud 
stemming from the marital relationship, where an 
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insured defendant spouse stands to benefit personally 
from losing a lawsuit instituted by his spouse. 
383 N.E.2d at 889-90. 
2. Prevention of Collusive Lawsuits 
A strong potential for collusive lawsuits between spouses 
exists where an insurance company is the real party in 
interest. Three dangers exist. The first danger is that 
fraudulent or trumped-up claims will be made. The second 
danger is that even where the claims are not trumped-up, where 
the marriage is harmonious, the offending spouse will not 
defend the action zealously. The third danger, as discussed 
above, is that where the offending spouse does defend zealously 
or wholeheartedly, as he or she should, tension and discord 
will arise. This Court in Rubalcava discarded any argument to 
the contrary. 384 P.2d at 390-91. 
The contention that courts are capable of weeding out 
fraudulent claims has been addressed and rejected by many 
courts. As one court stated: 
We expect too much of human nature if we believe that 
a husband and wife who sleep in the same bed, eat at 
the same table, and spend money from the same purse 
can be truly adversary to each other in a lawsuit when 
any judgment obtained by the plaintiff spouse will be 
paid by an insurance company and will ultimately 
benefit both spouses. . . . 
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Furthermore, [these cases are] akin to the danger-
ously prevalent view that such payments are free if 
the insurance company pays for it. Of course, some-
one, and us all, must pay insurance premiums which are 
determined on the basis of risks and losses incurred. 
Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 475 So.2d 
1211, 1213 (Fla. 1985) (quoting Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 
352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980)). See 
also Green v. Green, 4 Ohio App. 3d 133, 446 N.E.2d 837, 838 
(1982) ("The immunity prevents fraud and collusion at the 
expense of tactically disadvantaged insurance companies"); 
Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E. 2d 533 (1965), 
aff'd jLn Varholla v. Varholla, 56 Ohio St. 269, 383 N.E. 2d 888 
(1978) ("It is argued that the task of weeding out fraudulent 
or collusive suits is properly within the sphere of Courts and 
juries. In truly adversary cases, fraud is likely to be 
uncovered because of the desire of the defendant to avoid the 
loss. Where insurance is involved, the risk of loss is 
removed, and both spouses stand to gain from a decision adverse 
to the defendant. This creates a strong inducement to trump up 
claims and conceal possible defenses"); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 
286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955) ("We revere the jury system as the 
bulwark of individual liberty, but we are also realists, and we 
know that juries are, as a Kentucky mountaineer once 
said 'tolerable generous with other people's money, especially 
when the aroma of insurance permeates the courtroom1"). 
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Although insurance companies may be able to protect them-
selves against fraudulent claims by excluding spousal coverage 
in the policy itself (contractual interspousal immunity) or by 
increasing insurance rates to offset the cost of fraudulent 
claims (overall subsidization of the cost of collusive inter-
spousal claims), public policy and familial relationships are 
not enhanced by these alternatives. 
3. Avoidance of Rewarding Defendant Spouse for His or Her 
Own Wrongdoing 
In most cases after one spouse carelessly causes injury to 
the other, the couple continues to cohabit. Where one spouse 
obtains a court judgment against the other spouse and they 
continue to cohabit, it is reasonable to assume that the tort-
feasor shares in the benefits of an award paid by his or her 
insurance company. Burns v. Burns, 111 Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 
717, 719 (1974). Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co. , 475 So.2d 1211, 1213 (Fla. 1985) (citing Raisen v. Raisen, 
379 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 886 
(1980)). Public policy should disfavor a wrongdoer benefitting 
from his or her tortious conduct. 
4. Avoidance of Trivial or Spurious Lawsuits Between 
Spouses 
In a marriage, man and wife are intimate emotionally, 
psychologically and physically. The relationship should be 
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conducive to openness, compromise, adjustment and tolerance. 
People in marriage let down their guards, as it should be. 
However, because of individual differences and idiosyncrasies, 
the potential for conflict, tension and carelessness also 
exists. Abolition of interspousal immunity torts could lead to 
petty, trivial or spurious lawsuits over such conflicts. One 
can envision countless scenarios where conduct might be con-
sidered tortious but should not be considered actionable as 
between spouses. Some examples are shoveling the walks, waxing 
the floor, taking out the garbage, caring for children, 
unsatisfactory completion of other household duties and chores, 
and contraceptive use or sexual proclivity. 
The danger of opening the door to such actions exists and 
is not imagined as described in Moore, The Case for Retention 
of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 7 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 943, 949 
(1980): 
That the danger of what might be characterized as 
strange and improbable suits is real is illustrated by 
the cases of Mims v. Mims [305 So.2d 787 (Fla. 1974)], 
and Brown v. Brown [409 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1980)]. 
In the former case, a wife sued her husband for having 
fraudulently induced her to marry him "with false and 
fraudulent protestations of love" and having there-
after told her that he did not love her and then 
having left her (in a home defendant had purchased for 
the parties), assertively having done all the preced-
ing "with willfulness and malice." The Florida 
District Court of Appeal (Fourth District) affirmed a 
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judgment dismissing the action, citing interspousal 
tort immunity and adding: 
"The primary one [basis for denying this 
claim] lies in the demands of public policy 
which require, as we see it, that domestic 
quarrels—who did what to whom before and 
during the marriage—should not be the 
subject of damage suits and jury trials." 
In Brown, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
held that a wife, injured in a fall ascribable to her 
husband's alleged negligence in failing to shovel the 
walk after a snow storm, could not sue her spouse in 
tort. 
Regardless of whether abrogating spousal immunity would 
result in a rash of these lawsuits, a significant question 
before the Court is whether the door even should be opened to 
allow the potential for these suits or whether public policy 
should continue to encourage spouses to resolve these problems 
in ways more susceptible of mending familial relationships. 
5. A Change in Public Policy of the State Should Come 
From the Legislature 
The abolition of interspousal immunity for negligence would 
constitute a radical departure from existing public policy and 
traditional practice. The desirability of such a change is 
debatable at best. Any such modification of public policy and 
the law should be left to legislative discretion. As one Court 
stated: 
As to tort law, elimination of the doctrine could 
. . . open up a possibility of tort actions . . . that 
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could go to the heart of public policy and legislative 
policy relating to marriage. . . . [T]he problem is 
more appropriate for legislative solution than for 
judicial determination. The General Assembly has 
access to relevant information bearing upon these 
matters more significant than afforded this 
Court. . . . 
Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 162-63 (Del. 1979), appeal 
dismissed, 446 U.S. 931 (1980). See also Rubalcava v. 
Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389, 393 (1963) ("We are of 
the opinion that under the circumstances, in fairness to those 
who have relied thereon, and in proper deference to the soli-
darity of the law, any change could be justified only to 
correct patent error, otherwise it should be made by the 
legislature, plainly so declaring, so that all may be advised 
what the change is and when it will be effective") (emphasis 
added); Robeson v. International Indemnity Co., 282 S.E.2d 896 
(Ga. 1981) ("it is a rather close question as to whether abro-
gation of the doctrine at this juncture would be a proper 
exercise of judicial authority. Although it is true that the 
doctrine is of common-law origin, it is of long-standing 
application; and it is not unrealistic to presume that people 
have come to rely on it. In addition, it is the General 
Assembly and not this court that possesses the resources for 
determining the viability of the various policy considera-
tions. On matters such as whether husbands and wives should be 
allowed to sue each other in tort, the expressions of public 
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policy should come from the legislative branch") (citing 
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963)); 
Green v. Green, 4 Ohio App. 3d 133, 446 N.E. 2d 837, 838 (Ohio 
App. 1982)("If there is to be change in the public policy of 
the state [regarding interspousal immunity for unintentional 
torts], it should emanate from the General Assembly") (citing 
Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965)); 
6. Summary. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondent submits that 
this Court should affirm its decision in Rubalcava v. 
Gisseman. Perhaps more today than in 1963, the public policy 
of this state should be to promote good marriages and to deter 
collusive or trivial lawsuits. Interspousal immunity from 
negligence actions serves that policy well. The District 
Court's application of that rule to this case should be 
affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED UTAH LAW 
RATHER THAN CALIFORNIA LAW. 
Mrs. Forsman argues that because she and her husband are 
from California, her tort action should not be subject to the 
laws of Utah. This argument should be rejected for two 
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reasons. First, Mrs. Forsman's action only arises under the 
laws of the State of Utah because that is where the accident 
occurred. Second, even if a choice of law is necessary, Utah 
is the proper choice because it is the place where the alleged 
tort occurred and it is the place where the dispute will be 
resolved. These reasons give the State of Utah a more sub-
stantial interest in the outcome of the litigation regardless 
of whether the choice of law is based on lex loci delicti or on 
the Restatement rule cited by Mrs. Forsman. 
The negligence claim asserted by Mrs. Forsman is a transi-
tory claim. It arises, if at all, in the jurisdiction where 
the allegedly negligent conduct took place. Here, that conduct 
took place exclusively in Utah. For Mrs. Forsman to have a 
claim against her husband, that claim must have arisen in Utah, 
not in California. Apparently, such an action against her 
husband would have arisen in California; however, as Point I 
explains, no such action arose as a result of the accident that 
occurred in Utah. 
Although this court has not recently addressed Utah's 
choice of law rules, the existing rule is that the law of the 
place of the wrong governs in a tort action. That rule was 
fairly recently applied by the Tenth Circuit in Madison v. 
Deseret Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027 (1978). There a wife 
claimed that she was entitled to recover for loss of consortium 
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under the laws of Arizona because she and her husband were 
domiciled in Arizona. However, the Tenth Circuit ruled that 
because the accident occurred in Utah, the Utah court would 
apply Utah law. See also Jackson v. Continental Bank & Trust 
Co., 443 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir. 1971). The Utah Supreme Court 
has likewise looked to the place of the accident to determine 
whether a guest passenger was entitled to recover against a 
host driver. See e.g. Wood v. Taylor, 8 Utah 2d 210, 332 P.2d 
215 (1958) and Hudson v. Decker, 7 Utah 2d 24, 317 P.2d 594 
(1957). Hence, since the accident involving Mr. and Mrs. 
Forsman occurred in the State of Utah, the lower court properly 
applied Utah law in determining whether Mrs. Forsman had a 
cause of action against Mr. Forsman. 
Although this Court has not specifically ruled whether the 
law of the place of the wrong should govern whether inter-
spousal immunity exists, that has been the specific conclusion 
in several jurisdictions. In Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio 2d 243, 
208 N.E.2d 533 (1965), the law of Ohio was applied to a negli-
gence case where Ohio was both the place of injury and the 
forum state. The court refused to apply the law of Arizona 
even though that was the domicile of the parties at the time 
the action was filed. Similarly, in Landers v. Landers, 153 
Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966), the Connecticut court applied 
Virginia law to preclude a wife from recovering against her 
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husband even though the husband and wife were from Connecticut 
and Connecticut was the forum state. In Landers the 
Connecticut court considered the Restatement rule, Restatement 
(Second), Conflicts of Law § 169, and rejected it. 
In Henry v. Henry, 291 N.C. 156, 229 S.E.2d 158 (1976), the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether the law of 
Pennsylvania or the law of North Carolina governed a wife's 
claim against her husband for injuries sustained in an auto-
mobile accident. The accident occurred in North Carolina which 
was the forum state however the couple was domiciled in 
Pennsylvania at the time of the collision. The husband moved 
to dismiss his wife's complaint because the law of the forum in 
which his wife had sued did not allow her to maintain a negli-
gence action against him. This motion was granted and affirmed 
on appeal. The North Carolina Supreme Court reasoned as fol-
lows: 
The actionable quality of the defendant's conduct in 
inflicting injury upon the plaintiff must be deter-
mined by the law of the place where the injury was 
done; that is, the measure of the defendant's duty and 
his liability for negligence must be determined by the 
law of [North Carolina]. If an act does not give rise 
to a cause of action where it is committed, the 
general rule is that the party who commits the act 
will not be liable elsewhere, and in such event it is 
immaterial that a cause of action would have arisen if 
the wrong had been done in the jurisdiction of the 
forum. 
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229 S.E.2d at 160, quoting Howard v. Howard, 158 S.E. 101 (N.C. 
1931). The court pointed out that opening the door for appli-
cation of the law of the domicile was opening the door for a 
multitude of claims founded on the assertion that the law of 
the domicile was more equitable and just than the law of the 
site of the accident. 
Mr. Forsman submits that this is just one of several 
reasons for choosing Utah law over California law even if that 
choice must be made. As discussed in Point I, the reasons for 
maintaining the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity go 
beyond the individual relationship of Mr. and Mrs. Forsman or 
any couple who ends up on opposite sides of litigation. It is 
the Utah courts, not the California courts, which are exposed 
to the potential for fraud and collusion by a wife's action 
against her husband. Indeed even if the evil is not so 
insidious as to amount to fraud or collusion, it remains the 
Utah courts who must deal with the non-adversarial and there-
fore distorted nature of a wife's claim against her husband 
which is obviously filed only to obtain insurance proceeds that 
will benefit both of them. 
Likewise, it is the Utah courts, not the California courts, 
which would be subject to the trivial and spurious domestic 
disputes which are possible if suits for ordinary negligence 
are allowed between husband and wife. These concerns must be 
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added to the simple and traditionally most important fact that 
the accident and injuries occurred in this state. 
Further, Mrs. Forsman asks this Court to apply California 
law to part of her claim against her husband while she is 
making no argument that California law applies to her claim 
against Ronald Flinders or the State of Utah. In this context 
the Restatement approach advocated by Mrs. Forsman promotes 
undue complexity and uncertainty. Part of the action would be 
governed by Utah law and part of the action would be governed 
by California law, depending on the countervailing interests of 
each party as to each particular issue. Under these circum-
stances, the most efficient and most equitable result is to 
apply the law of Utah to the entire action. 
For these reasons, Mr. Forsman respectfully submits that 
the District Court properly applied the law of Utah in deter-
mining whether a cause of action arose in favor of Mrs. Forsman 
against her husband. 
CONCLUSION 
Interspousal immunity for negligence should remain intact 
for the reasons set forth above. Elimination of the immunity 
would be a radical departure from the common law and the strong 
public policy favoring the maintenance of familial relation-
ships. Inroads into familial and marital solidarity should be 
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resisted. In this case, that issue should be governed by Utah 
law because Utah is where the action arose and because Utah is 
the state which will be most affected by the case. Therefore, 
the summary judgment granted in favor of Mr. Forsman should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 1987. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
KBymon^ 
John R. Lund 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Respondent George Forsman 
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